Diary of a Combatant Page 24
9. José R. Silva, platoon chief, was wounded by a bullet to the right shoulder, which paralyzed his arm.
10. Juan Hernández (Guanchi) from Ángel Frías’s platoon, was gravely wounded in the leg during the bombardment and later died from loss of blood, and Emilio Oliva Hernández from la Punta de Vanguardia was slightly wounded.
11. Marabú is a spiny brush that is prolific in the eastern part of Cuba.
12. A place known as Tembladera.
13. General Francisco Tabernilla was chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Batista’s armed forces. The anticommunist statements made by the general were based primarily on documents that came from a lost backpack that belonged to Pablo Rivalta, a member of the PSP, and a combatant in the column.
14. Santos Almanza provided a guide to continue the march.
15. According to the testimony of Lieutenant Armando Acosta he tried to shoot some rounds at the soldiers and his weapon jammed, giving the order to combatant Juan Arias Noguera to shoot despite Che’s instructions. This had the consequence that Batista’s army detected their position and they had to retreat to a place farther into the swamp.
16. Rogelio Acevedo, Wilfredo Aleaga (Willy) and the guide Ramón Guilarte.
17. Medardo Ruperto Cabrera Portal (Cabrerita) was a member of the PSP in Las Villas, whom they asked to get information about the Escambray area.
October 1958
1
Cabrera leaves with no new developments. It seems that there are no Rural Guards after us. We left at 5:00 in the afternoon after explaining to all the officers the precautions that had to be taken to cross the [railroad] line. We approached it, but our best efforts couldn’t eliminate the sound of our feet in the water. The vanguard arrived and the whole troop took the line without incident but leaving a well-marked trail. We walked until dawn through arduous quagmires, resting at the end in a dry spot where we cooked.
2
We walked all day, arriving at a spot that offered plenty of security, from which we dispatched scouts. According to Emerio [Reyes] there was a house near the mill that would be good to visit. At night we went there but couldn’t find the house and had to stay in the scrubland.
3
Two scouts set out early to look for the occupants of the house, while we killed a cow and some pigs. One of the men from the house was brought in, who turned out to be the butcher from Baraguá [Felipe Méndez Ruiz], and he said that last night the whole troop from the sugar mill had withdrawn. The strip we were going along was the Itabo River that empties into the canals and swamps. In a little while two more were detained by the sentry. One of them turned out to be the hunter [Jorge Álvarez Durán] from Baraguá who offered to help with everything. I let him go to look for some medicine and in three hours the scout plane appeared, circled once and landed at the sugar mill’s airstrip. Five minutes later it took off again circling the woods repeatedly. I ordered a withdrawal to the clearing in the woods and we waited there for the visit of the B-26 planes. It wasn’t too long before the machine-gunning began and seven bombs were dropped. Everyone knew we had been betrayed, but it had to be clarified who the traitor was—something we still don’t know. We left at night through a broad swampland with a lagoon, which took us three and a half hours to cross, until we made it to a wood where the guide got lost and we called it a night.
4
We left slowly crossing pastures until we reached a hamlet called Palenque where the Rural Guards had been a few days earlier. We obtained a guide who took us through the cane fields to La Rosa Liberal farm, where we slept in the middle of a storm provoked by a hurricane that is forming nearby.
5
I ordered that we take over the hamlet [of Rosa Liberal] and shortly we had housing, cows and cheese. The rain was incessant. A man called Pepe [José Valcárcel Fernández] came to offer us everything under the sun. The foot disease, known here as “mazamorra,” has struck the troops, who can hardly walk, so I decided not to leave tonight as the storm was at its maximum intensity. We set free the men we had forced to be our guides and released a kid from Camagüey, who had been shown to be a coward; during the night before another one from Camagüey had fled, abandoning two bazooka shells that were lost. We estimate that there are 10 who can’t walk, but we have obtained 15 horses, most of them without saddles.
6
At 4:00 in the morning, when we were about to leave, we were told that Pepe’s wife was sick and had gone to Ciego [de Ávila]. This sent chills up my spine. We walked a league, setting up camp in a wood near the [railroad] line until we could see a way to cross it. The day passed uneventfully. Cabrerita arrived with a guide [Andrés Flores Gutiérrez] that the PSP had sent and brought a bunch of reports about the situation in the Escambray, as well as offers of a radio and mimeograph machine. We left tonight because Pepe didn’t come. We walked about four leagues crossing the line and the highway of the famous Trocha de Júcaro that wasn’t as bad as we had thought as there wasn’t a single guardsman there. We reached a small wood [Hilario Woods] where we camped until dawn.
7
This morning we got some food, cooking in the woods, but La O, who was in charge of getting it, let himself be seen. Nevertheless, there was no problem whatsoever and we were able to leave tonight. Three delegates came from the Escambray,1 bringing a rosary of complaints about [Eloy] Gutiérrez Menoyo and his people from the Second Front. I get the impression from here that there is a lot of dirty washing all over the place. A delegate [Inocencio Rancaño] from the PSP arrived, bringing us some nylon and an offer of money, which I accepted and asked him for a contact with the [party] leadership. Seven men who had turned coward were dismissed: two of them had joined recently, the others were from the Sierra Maestra. The hardships we’ve endured have had an effect on the morale of the troop. Their names are: Victor Sarduy and Juan Noguera (from Silva’s platoon); Ernesto Magaña and Rigoberto Solís (from Roberto’s squadron); Oscar Macías (from Daniel’s)—all these were from Joel’s [platoon]; and Teodoro Reyes and Rigoberto Alarcón2 (from Fonso’s group, Angelito’s platoon).
We marched almost all night on good trails but under heavy rain, with plenty of horses, reaching a wood below where we had to bunch together in the swamp in order to sleep.
8
We set out on a short march of 12 to 14 kilometers to the Pelegrín farm, which we accomplished without any problem, setting up camp in the foreman’s3 house to cook, while Miguel González [Martínez], the guide from the Escambray, went out to explore what our next day’s march would be. We obtained some more horses. In the course of the night he [Herman Marks] leaves.4
Notebook VIII
The North American had the rank of captain. He was sick and wounded but, fundamentally, he didn’t fit in with the troop. The troop had to leave in a rather disorganized manner because the contacts established in La Teresa, a farm where we had planned to eat, had failed because it was full of Rural Guards. The planes shot exactly where we were yesterday; they were B-26s.
9
This morning Miguel arrived saying it was impossible to pass a very bad stretch with a deep canal and that the Jatibonico [River] couldn’t be crossed either, with the bridges controlled by the army, as well; he proposed moving to a nearby wood, but I didn’t agree because there are machine gunners around where we were yesterday and it seems that they are closely following our trail. I decided to send for the horses that we had left behind and some others ahead of us so that we could get away. We crossed a deep canal after a march of two leagues through mud and water, and then we went a further league and a half on a worse trail to reach a wood called Macío,5 where the ground was completely under water. The only partially encouraging note is that there is a rice farm [Pozo Viejo] nearby with provisions which one of the men6 knows about because he once worked there. The men’s feet have deteriorated again due to all the trudging through muddy water.
10
We made contact with the rice field workers [especially Manuel Gamboa Montoya], wh
o promised to investigate the viability of crossing the second bridge, while other people from the area checked out an alternative.
The small plane made circles over the wood, shooting repeatedly into it, without hitting us, apparently following the trail left by the horses up to the beginning of the wood. Later, a rice worker came with the news that the man who was going to check out the river had gone; but we also got news that the Rural Guards were already in control of the bridge. It was a terrible night and we were delayed because we had to eat, so we decided that everyone should stay in a house, with the doors closed, taking the horses to a nearby wood, in case [the Rural Guards] were actually following our trail from the air. The vanguard went with the guides to the dairy farm near the river with the mission of crossing it however they could and to have it under control by the time we got there.
11
We spent the day resting in a house while the light aircraft circled over the wood. In the house7 where the vanguard is there’s a telephone and we could overhear various telephone conversations between them [the planes], which gave us exact information about the army’s position. With that and a guide we crossed the river without mishap, although with great difficulty and many of the weapons got wet. The Rural Guards knew exactly where we were, but they didn’t believe, or they decided not to believe, that we would reach the river during the night.8 We reached a good but humid wood where we spent the day.
12
The light plane showed that it knew our itinerary, shooting at the other side of the river, but not near where we were. At night we left on a long six-league journey with those on horseback going first. We reached a place where there was a pick-up truck in a small hamlet at 3:00 in the morning. Everything went well until the last ones let themselves be seen, when it was already daylight, in a hamlet on the Romero rice farm, where the Rural Guards had decided to intercept us. We reached a small wood in full daylight.
13
We spent the day waiting for the planes, but nothing happened. Miguel9 went to explore on one side and Ottén10 on the other. Ottén’s messenger arrived rather late, but we had to wait for Miguel, who arrived even later telling us that everything was in order and there were three barges to cross the Zaza [River]. We reached a causeway where Ottén was supposed to be waiting for us with a truck, but we discovered he had been held up and we had to continue in the same manner. Crossing the Zaza River—the widest we have had to cross—was fast and without problems. We slept in a nearby wood.11
14
During the day Martínez went to look for some horses, but he took too long and we had to leave almost at midnight. The guide took us indirectly through some cane fields, but the lateness of our departure and the slow march of the men on foot meant it was daybreak before we reached our destination, Las Damas farm, on the other side of the highway from Sancti Spíritus to Trinidad.
15
We were immediately visited by a peasant,12 who invited us to stay at the farm where he worked, and who told us that soldiers were all along the road. We spent the day in the area making contact with some young men who were members of the Revolutionary Directorate, but they immediately asked to join the July 26 Movement,13 which I didn’t allow because I felt we shouldn’t make such a sectarian policy without first talking with our people.
A PSP representative [Amador Antúnez García] came to confer with me, giving me some details about the situation of the Second Front from his point of view, which is backing Gutiérrez Menoyo over Bordón.14 He told me that if a unity agreement was signed his party would place itself at our disposition. Later three representatives of the July 26 Movement came; one of them, Carlos,15 who is in charge of the workers in Las Villas, gave me some reports about the situation, explaining that Bordón was always sniping at the leadership and that recently he had boiled over, leaving both forces openly hostile. I made an appointment with him on the 20th and asked him for reports that had come for me from Oriente. I explained my intention regarding unity and the elections, but I didn’t find him very enthusiastic about the idea of coordinating mass actions in the cities along with armed attacks on them.
We left at night with some guides belonging to the Revolutionary Directorate, but who were said to be from the July 26 Movement.16 We crossed the highway without mishap and reached Obispo Hill by dawn.
16
We marched a few leagues along a highway in high spirits, resting in a little coffee grove.17 I learned that it was near the guerrilla group of a man called Bombino, who belonged to the July 26 Movement. In the meantime, another man called Pompilio Viciedo,18 who had killed two men who tried to disarm him, arrived. He placed himself at the disposition of the movement, although I said that before anything he would be placed on trial, and he agreed to this. Instead of coming here, the captain of the movement sent a horse so that I could go and see him; I told him that he should come to me. He came and it turned out not to be the Bombino guy but Sorí,19 who was a man trusted by the general staff of the Second Front and who wasn’t openly hostile. We spent the day there.
17
We moved a few leagues, no more than two, camping on the property of a Havana plantation owner, Dr. Cárdenas, where we asked for some horses and necessary provisions. We were waiting for the arrival of Rafael,20 with whom I had an appointment, but he didn’t show up. There we carried out the first symbolic handover of the land to a peasant.
18
We left Gavilanes in no haste on main roads, at night reaching another camp of the Second Front, whose chief had also been relieved and the new one, a guy called Balunga, wasn’t there.
19
Just when we were ready to leave, we found that Rafael had arrived. I sent all the troops on ahead and we spent the day talking. I expressed my ideas about unity and accepted some suggestions and concrete offers. I wasn’t able to reach commander Carreras’s21 camp tonight.
20
I arrived at the camp in the morning, but I couldn’t speak with Carreras because he had left already. A little later I read a flyer that said, in its point 10, that no troop could pass through this territory, and that the first time they would be given a warning, but the second time they would be expelled or exterminated.22 I brought the men together to talk to them about this and everyone was [blank in the original] that there should be no shooting among compañeros who shared the same ideals. After a while Carreras arrived and I told him that it was unacceptable to issue such an “order.” He responded, saying he had used that word because he was a “little thick.” He offered an explanation about point 10, saying that it was aimed at the people from the Revolutionary Directorate who “had stolen things from him.”
I received word that some of the members of the provincial leadership were already here and that Menoyo had sent an ultimatum to Bordón, telling him that if he didn’t abandon the hills on Saturday he would be attacked. I advised Carreras that he should send a letter to Gutiérrez suggesting that he should desist; I also told him that he should not expect reprisals from us, despite everything. He replied ironically that reprisals were expected only from Batista.
We reached an encampment of the Revolutionary Directorate in Algarrobo, where Tony Santiago,23 commander of the Directorate, received me. Serafín [Ruiz de Zárate], a doctor from Cienfuegos who helped the people a lot, according to Ottén, was there. He had come to join the group in the Sierra because he was being heavily persecuted [in the city]. He gave me a lot of information about the situation with Bordón, explaining that Bordón hadn’t made it to the Sierra Maestra to see Fidel and that he had lied to his troops. He described the situation in general and reported an ultimatum made by Gutiérrez Menoyo. We spent the night there.
21
We left in no hurry to reach Dos Arroyos, the general headquarters of the Revolutionary Directorate, in the middle of the afternoon. At night we had an interview with Faure Chomón24 and Cubela25 on general topics as it was already quite clear that the discussions on unity couldn’t take place on the basis of the
sovereignty of the July 26 Movement. I proposed a joint action at Güinía de Miranda on the basis of sharing weapons, and this was accepted in principle, albeit without enthusiasm. I also proposed a series of general administrative measures and the partition of the territory into zones of influence, where the forces of other organizations could operate freely, and this was accepted without objections, leaving the final decisions on each subject for a future time.
The doctor from Cienfuegos told me that the “hills” had treated him very badly, that his specialty [dermatology] wasn’t useful here and that he could still provide services in the llano. I’m not sure of the exact cause of his attitude, but it’s typical of the organization of the llano. Sierra [Enrique Oltuski],26 who had talked with me for a long time yesterday, tacitly confessed that he was one of those primarily responsible for the mess of signing the declaration, and that he had gone abroad where he had recognized Gutiérrez Menoyo’s leadership of the Second Front. When I asked him for a report on which banks were located in the villages so that we could attack them and take the money, he had a fit. They all opposed with their silence the free distribution of land and showed their subordination to big capital; this was especially the case with Sierra [Oltuski].
22
I had agreed to go this morning to see Cubela, but commander [Alfredo] Peña from the Second Front turned up. He began in a friendly tone, but soon showed his true colors. We parted cordially, but as sworn enemies. I saw Cubela in the afternoon. He had agreed to give me information about the military barracks, supplied by a doctor from the village, but he didn’t offer anything. It seems to me that the problem is that they are trying to bluff about their weapons because it seems they have no interest in launching attacks.
23
We spent the day resting, with no activity other than receiving visitors and writing a long report to Fidel about the march on Las Villas and the political-military situation in the zone.