Diary of a Combatant Page 26

  18

  The day passed with nothing new, I ordered some work done in Fomento, but it wasn’t carried out because of some organizational problems.

  No other entries appear in this notebook from November 19 through December 2, although Che left several blank pages, presumably because he intended to fill in the events that had occurred at some later date. The diary’s next and last entry is dated December 3.

  1. William Morgan was a US CIA agent, who joined the forces of the Second Front of the Escambray. After the triumph of the revolution he was executed for treason. The message he sent argued that the achievement of revolutionary unity in Las Villas was impossible.

  2. This became the general command post where a number of installations were built: a hospital, warehouses, kitchen, amphitheater, radio transmitter and a place to produce the newspaper Patria, and the “Ñico López” school for recruits were among the most important.

  3. As commander of the region of Las Villas, Che issued Military Order No. 1 on behalf of the July 26 Movement. See the appendices to this book.

  4. This represented the beginning of the unity agreement with the Revolutionary Directorate that culminated in the signing of the Pedrero Pact on December 1 after Batista’s army offensive was unleashed in the Escambray, ending in total defeat. See the appendices to this book..

  December 1958

  3

  The day passed with no new developments, in the evening we received the news that the Rural Guards have abandoned Mata. I ordered that we attack them as they leave Santa Lucía. From Fomento we hear that the entire reinforcement troop left for Cienfuegos because apparently there is a conspiracy [among the soldiers] there, but we have no confirmation of that. From Cabaiguán and Sancti Spíritus there are messages from Carlos indicating that Fidel has ordered that urgent attention be paid to FRANI, but I don’t know what that means.1

  1. See the chapter “The Final Offensive” in Che’s Reminiscences… The meaning of the reference to FRANI is not clear.

  Appendices

  Documents from the Sierra Maestra

  El Cubano Libre, the paper edited by Che in the Sierra Maestra as the “Official Organ of the July 26 Revolutionary Army.”

  Later editions of El Cubano Libre from the Sierra Maestra.

  (1 of 3)

  Facsimiles of “Sin bala en el directo” [“Without firing a shot”] written by Che under the pen name Francotirador [“Sharpshooter”] and published in El Cubano Libre.

  (2 of 3)

  (3 of 3)

  (1 of 2)

  Portrait of the fallen combatant Ciro Redondo written by Che and published in El Cubano Libre.

  (2 of 2)

  (1 of 4)

  Military order signed by Fidel Castro in August 1958 giving Che Guevara, as head of the Ciro Redondo Column Eight, the mission to extend the revolutionary war front to Las Villas province.

  (2 of 4)

  (3 of 4)

  (4 of 4)

  LETTER FROM FAUSTINO PÉREZ TO ARMANDO HART

  Sierra Maestra

  October 3, 1958

  Dr. Armando Hart,

  Compañero and brother,

  I want to shake the laziness out of my pen to write you a letter that I have owed you for some time. Since the ill-fated days when you fell prisoner, I have wanted to express to you all the concern and anguish that affected us and the entire movement regarding your fate in the claws of the thugs and what your capture meant for us.

  The movement was entering a stage of revolutionary consolidation, we could count on increasing public support, our forces were multiplying militarily and, in terms of organization, our cadres had definitely become more militant. What was lacking was establishing a more thoroughly integrated leadership, a more systematic orientation and more complete and precise doctrine and program. Your trip to and stay in the liberated zone made us conceive of the certainty of being able to make, upon your return, a formidable step forward in achieving these goals. The analysis and discussion of all the problems related to the revolution and the movement must have been fruitful, especially for those like you who, in addition to extraordinary capabilities, had the forthrightness and willingness to state them, define and resolve them. No wonder such a revolutionary and historic document as [Fidel Castro’s] letter to the Cuban Liberation Junta emerged in such circumstances. On the other hand, we already had the precedent of your vibrant performance as the chief coordinator of the movement, where you left, in a short period of time, a bright and fruitful mark. But the worst happened at the best time. We were left with a directionless leadership, although the movement showed its strength by preventing your assassination, which was yet another victory that served as further encouragement to continue. Things could not continue to be as they had been with your guiding presence, invigorated by the trip [to the Sierra Maestra]; but we had to continue and we entrusted Zoilo with your position in order to make your absence felt less keenly.

  I was still convinced that Havana needed special attention, so I returned there, and it is my firm conviction that we took the movement to its “Golden Era” in the capital, the peak of which was between the kidnapping of Fangio1 and the 21 Point Manifesto that came out of a meeting in the Sierra Maestra during moments of revolutionary effervescence in the llano.

  We all agreed that the level of organization achieved and the state of tension in the air encouraged the initiative of the general strike. A spontaneous and total student walkout had crystalized. We began working toward the decisive dates of April 1 and 5 suggested in the Manifesto, which seemed to prolong the agony of a regime on its deathbed. We were of the opinion that Monday March 31 was the best date, but when we told the compañeros in Santiago, they thought it would be better to wait a few more days. Hence the April 9 date emerged. It was one of the first errors that led to a failure that should never have been. Even worse errors consisted of inadequate and counterproductive tactical mechanisms that were put in place to produce and call for the strike. And so we later saw clearly how an organization that had reached an acceptable level of efficiency did not function because we didn’t give it a chance. We kept secret the agreed upon date, supposedly to benefit the actions of the militias, and we did a last minute call on several radio stations, at a time—11:00 in the morning—when only a few housewives are tuning in; and on a date when the momentum had been lost.

  We caught by surprise our own organized cadres (workers of the Civic Resistance, students, and even our tactical action squads) and the general population who learned, by various means and at different times, about the call [for a general strike] from an uncertain source. Had the call for a general strike been launched 48 hours earlier, informing and mobilizing the entire organization, it would have come off as a formidable element of necessary agitation. All this, added to the incomplete sabotage of public services and other less visible and immediate targets, wiped out what should otherwise have been a sure thing.

  Thus the strike in Havana was undermined and the tragic consequences have been incalculable. Not only did we waste another opportunity to overthrow the tyranny—the streets of the capital and the entire soil of Cuba were again drenched with selfless blood—but in the minds of the general public, and even in those of our revolutionary leadership, there was a false impression that our tried and true strategy of general strike and armed uprising was wrong and even our militants were clamoring for unity and the theory of a war of armies.

  I personally take responsibility for all of it and I feel a personal despair like nothing I have ever experienced before. I was not immune to the loss of so many dedicated combatants, promising cadre who will not be there to build the future or meet the needs of the present struggle. Just to mention those closest to us, in only a few days we lost Fontán, Alcides Pérez, Mingolo, Sergio, Marcelo, Pepe, Alemancito, Lucero and, to top it all off, your brother, our brother Enrique [Hart], who was killed, as you yourself said, by his enthusiasm. That person, filled with restlessness and overflowing with vitality, al
ways held tightly the cord of action. In his orbit there could be nothing dead or static. He was like the “strong water” to test the “pure gold” and eliminate the false. The revolution will feel his absence and, together with the pain of not having him, we will feel the inspiration of his example and mettle.

  The failure and its tragic consequences, the knowledge of the mistakes committed, and other internal weaknesses and mea culpas, have left a deep scar on my spirit, and with my soul destroyed I left for the heroic Sierra Maestra with my convictions a bit awry. I had thought myself stronger and that had made me weak. But the Sierra is a savior. It has saved the revolution from being annihilated and it saves sick souls from death. To breathe the fresh mountain air, to live with nature, exercise your muscles and your will through the effort of hard living and sacrifice, to be overcome with the emotion of fighting for liberty in an environment where you fall illuminated by the sun and are embraced by a grateful earth—this detoxifies, stimulates, heals, recuperates and revives.

  Like a shadow my stubborn thoughts followed me, perhaps it was my pride, thinking that Havana—problematic and slandered—was capable of responding, and that I could, and should, make it so. But the will of the executive in the Sierra Maestra won out and I returned here with Daniel, Mario, and Franqui, united with Fidel. The difficult trip to the general command took almost a month, during a crucial time for the revolution. The dictatorship, emboldened by the failure of the strike, thought it was the right time to take out the bulwark of the Sierra, and to that end concentrated all its efforts, launching an offensive of incredible magnitude. They penetrated deep into the mountains and every day the “helmets” [Batista’s forces] were closing in. The situation became critical. But the justice of our cause served to raise morale, increase the fighting spirit, and multiply the invisible forces. This reality worked within the men of the Rebel Army, sometimes consciously, and more often by instinct and influence, producing, with Fidel’s strategic genius, the miracle, or rather, the extraordinary feat of turning an extremely difficult situation into a resounding triumph and, for the dictatorship, an easy victory became an embarrassing military disaster.

  I don’t know whether the curtain of cell bars and silence that separates you from the outside has allowed you to be aware of the succession of military statements issued by the general command during the offensive. The truthful, beautiful and strong content [of their statements] and their political guidance reveal the great maturity, revolutionary sincerity and leadership capability of Fidel which, coupled with his extraordinary work ethic and his powerful intuition, make up for his tendency to forget the rules and organizational systems and do almost everything himself. Of course this is an unconscious tendency, as when it is drawn to his attention, he recognizes the usefulness and need for this, so I have hope that we can also improve in this area.

  And so, the end result of the offensive can be summed up as follows: more than 500 weapons seized, including 81 and 60 mortars, bazookas, heavy machine guns, a good amount of ammunition, more than 400 wounded and prisoners turned over to the International Red Cross, which has had incalculable military, political and human consequences. Several hundred dead enemies, 27 losses on our side and 50 wounded, with not one prisoner; the accelerated departure of the rest of [Batista’s] forces from the Sierra Maestra and the nearby towns; consolidation and expansion of the liberated zone; an immediate offensive launched by multiple rebel columns that are invading the western provinces; the increasing demoralization of Batista’s army with massive incidences of insubordination; a growing sense of a combative spirit in the cities. Honestly, I never thought what I am seeing was a possibility and that was one of our biggest errors. While recognizing the sierra as a focal point of rebellion with an extraordinary symbolic importance, we failed to calculate its military possibilities. I still remember I told Fidel (when I came with [New York Times journalist Herbert] Matthews) that the important thing was for [the guerrillas] not to be destroyed, that they should hide deep in a cave since all that was needed was for it to be known that they were there [in the mountains] while we would take care of the rest in the llano.

  Today I am happy he [Fidel] didn’t listen to me. Although the reverse was also true in that the sierra lost sight of appreciating the struggle in the cities. On a tragically significant day for the movement we lost Daniel. This was on July 30, on the first anniversary of Frank’s [País] death. His was the only casualty in our next-to-last battle on the brink of the victory that he, on the front line, had helped forge. It was one more loss, which Cuba, I am sure, has mourned in silence. One cannot conceive that such a true revolutionary, wholesome spirit, generous son could give his life for his suffering mother without her shedding tears. We lost another brother and we felt that our hearts grew smaller and smaller each time.

  My role in all this process of the offensive was more that of active spectator than direct protagonist. I now begin to exercise my limited capabilities as head of the civil administration of the liberated zone (ACTL). I believe it will be of positive value that, even in the midst of the rigors of battle, the movement shows its readiness to begin to organize with revolutionary enthusiasm the collective life of the territory it governs, to defend and encourage the legitimate interests and concerns of the people, to promote and put at the service of the people the potential growth and wealth [of Cuba] that circumstances, nature, and hard work can offer. By taking responsibility and with forward thinking we can show what can be done in Cuba with all the resources of power in the hands of the revolution. During the offensive activities not directly related to the war were suspended, but as the war winds down the many concerns of the peasant population are being attended to. We have established throughout the [liberated] territory many community meetings, hospitals, and courts. [We have] a prison (Puerto Malanga), with a penitentiary system unparalleled in its humaneness, service to the public and hygiene. The military recruit training school is headed by Aldo, the honorable brother of his brothers, with 400 students at this time, where citizen-soldiers are being forged, and where the recruits’ educational and medical needs are met, in addition to their military training. The peasants are being organized and any labor or endeavor that promotes the betterment of their lives will be supported. If, despite the challenges and scarce resources, and in the midst of the august and eloquent silence of these mountains, we are able to make real our hopes, I will feel satisfied. While the indomitable rebel forces penetrate into the heart of the provinces to shake the already crumbling scaffolding of the dictatorship, to the heart of these mountains many valuable compañeros are arriving to nurture their capacity to work and create. [...]

  With an embrace,

  Fausto

  1. Juan Manuel Fangio was a famous Argentine racing car driver.

  Documents from the campaign in Las Villas

  Military Order No. 1, November 8, 1958, issued by Che Guevara as commander-in-chief of the July 26 Movement in Las Villas.

  Facsimile of Patria, the newspaper of the July 26 Movement in Las Villas province.

  (1 of 2)

  Facsimiles of Milicianos, the newspaper of the July 26 Movement militias in Las Villas province.

  (2 of 2)

  Facsimile of the Pact of El Pedrero, signed on December 1, 1958, by Che Guevara for the July 26 Movement and Rolando Cubela for the Revolutionary Directorate.

  Unity Pact signed on December 12, 1958, by Che Guevara for the July 26 Movement and Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo for the Second Front of the Escambray.

  LETTER FROM LIDIA DOCE TO CHE GUEVARA

  My dear commander,

  How are you? Do you still remember me? Well I haven’t been able to stop thinking of you for one moment, always waiting for the mail to see if you’ve written me, I think you will have already received the camera and are pleased with me. I want to remind you of something, perhaps you have forgotten, in Las Vegas you offered me a pistol, and I think you forgot. I need it now here in Havana because I don’t have one. When are you go
ing to send for me? I wait for you, my dear commander, and I am waiting for them to deliver the uniforms as I don’t know where they are going to be sent. I am struggling here, although I’m unhappy because I don’t have my commander here to give me orders, and to understand what I have to do, so I am organizing women. It’s called the July 26 Women’s Group. What do you think? I have a lot of work, it’s too much for me on my own because, since [Delio Gómez] Ochoa left [for the mountains], I’ve been very much on my own; tell me if you received what I requested in Bayamo, that is, plates, pots and everything you needed in your command post. But by God send for me soon! Because I want to see you and give you a big hug just as you deserve, even if I don’t.

  Send my warm regards to Gile [Israel Pardo Guerra] and Miguel [Álvarez]. I’ve got a very fierce German puppy for you, its parents are champions from New York. Would you like it? I hope so. Receive the strongest embrace possible.

  Always your

  Lydia

  Glossary

  ACEVEDO GONZÁLEZ, ENRIQUE: Born in Placetas, Las Villas, on August 12, 1942. He joined the Rebel Army in July 1957 as a member of Column Four. He was later a member of Che’s Column Eight.