The Awakening of Latin America Page 36

  Moderator: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. As you have heard, Dr. Ernesto Guevara, minister of the economy of the revolutionary government, is here with us tonight to report to the people of Cuba about the Punta del Este conference. The way he represented Cuba in that conference, in which insidious attempts were made to organize the other Latin American countries against Cuba, won him the respect of everyone—including our adversaries—and, naturally, the gratitude of all Cubans.

  As you know, Dr. Guevara visited Buenos Aires at the conclusion of the Punta del Este conference and met with President Frondizi. After that, he went to Brasilia, where President Quadros presented him with the Order of the Southern Cross, Brazil’s highest decoration. All this has increased the interest in his appearance tonight.

  Dr. Guevara will begin by addressing you, after which, as usual, journalists may ask questions.

  Che Guevara: Before answering the compañero journalists’ questions, I will summarize—as briefly as possible—the results of the conference, its initial goals and the role that Cuba and the other countries played in it.

  I will begin by explaining what the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES) conference was. The CIES is a part of the Organization of American States (OAS) that concerns itself with economic matters in the Americas. Traditionally, it has been dominated by US imperialist interests, and has been completely under that influence up to now.

  The Conference of Economic Ministers—and this is the source of the small mistake that [moderator] compañero [Luis Gómez] Wangüemert made, because I am not minister of the economy, though the conference was one of economic ministers—was held in order to establish an “Alliance for Progress,” as Kennedy announced, and, naturally, to chain the Latin American countries more tightly to the financial organizations of Wall Street, to isolate Cuba and, if possible, to organize another armed attack on Cuba.

  We had some very important—and rather different—tasks: to work with our sister Latin American republics, to try to get the conference to adopt positions that were more in line with the peoples’ interests, to unmask imperialism, and to counter its attempts to isolate us by isolating it instead. These were ambitious goals, and it was not possible to achieve them in full, but we did manage to bring out some aspects that were important to the Latin American governments and peoples.

  First of all, the falsehood of the Alliance for Progress was proved to the governments represented at the conference, along with the imperialist motives that lie behind it, in all the work, in all the little committees that were formed outside the conference. The North Americans’ attempts to isolate us were exposed, and it was also made clear that the peoples and governments could not make progress along the path of humiliation and subjugation to the interests of Wall Street. Presumably, the countries that have shown a more independent attitude are those that have benefited the most from this Alliance for Progress, although, naturally, it is impossible to know what the exact results of the Alliance for Progress are as yet, for it is based on a framework of suppositions and lies that, in the best of cases, should still be judged by reality, and it is very probable that reality will show that it is a great confidence trick mounted against the Latin American peoples.

  Right from the beginning of the conference, we described it as a political meeting and exposed the attempts being made to isolate Cuba. We strongly opposed the fifth point that was discussed in the fourth commission of the conference, related to promoting the Alliance for Progress plan. It was a plan for taming Latin American public opinion and placing it at the service of the United States. As soon as nearly all the large Latin American countries, headed by Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, opposed that point—and many other, smaller nations, too—it was eliminated. Cuba led the discussion on this subject, and with good reason, as it was expressly named in the preliminary report—the document that was later called the preliminary report—which described Cuba as “a dictatorship that had eliminated all organs of the press.”

  The worst thing was not this political characterization of Cuba, but the fact that a supposed inter-American organization, in which all countries have the same rights, was allowing itself to judge and denounce Cuba’s position, through the officials of that organization, who were also the owners of reactionary Latin American newspapers. Thus, we were automatically denounced by an intercontinental organization, judged by a group of so-called experts, but without any trial by the Latin American nations.

  Right from the start, the criticism of Cuba centered on that fifth point, which, as I have said, was eliminated, and it was replaced with a version which, though still poisonous, was much harder to pin down.

  Naturally, different countries had very different positions. At the beginning, some formal mistakes were made that forced Cuba to protest. Minister of the Economy Beltrán Espantoso, the delegate from Peru, was named to represent all the visiting delegations in thanking President Haedo. It was a ceremonial role, and it should have been nothing more than a courteous address; but the Peruvian minister expressed a political opinion of the Alliance for Progress, placing it directly within the “Christian, Western civilization” of “representative democracy,” with “free elections,” etc. So Cuba had to protest. It was a double protest: first, because, in a ceremonial address, when you are representing all the countries, you should not express political opinions, which must be discussed; and, second, because Cuba had not been consulted on this and, without its agreement, the delegate from a country that did not have diplomatic relations with us had been named to represent all the countries.

  At first, the situation was volatile, but the delegate from Ecuador immediately supported us, because he had not been consulted, either. Thus, some issues like this were brought out.

  In the plenary session, before the various delegations took the floor, we expressed our thanks to the people and government of Uruguay and said that we were doing this independently because we did not agree with the statements that Mr. Beltrán had made earlier.

  Several different positions were defined right from the start. Cuba’s position, naturally, placed it at one extreme of the intercontinental struggle that was waged in Punta del Este. The United States was at the other extreme, and there was a very wide range in between that can be reduced to two or three main positions.

  Most of the small Caribbean countries—and some South American countries, as well—took a servile position on the side of the United States, voting for all the measures that the United States proposed or that it proposed through other countries (usually Guatemala or Peru, though at times it also used others). The use of proxies is a common US tactic.

  Some countries fought for specific economic measures, supposing that this was not a political conference; in other words, they did not take part in the political debates of the conference. These countries included Argentina and, to some extent, Mexico.

  Other countries clearly recognized the importance of the need for Latin American unity, saw the danger of Cuba’s isolation, and understood the basis of this Alliance for Progress. Their champion was Brazil, whose decisive action kept the conference from adopting other kinds of resolutions that could have been detrimental to the Cuban delegation. The specific instructions of President Quadros meant that, at all times, the United States had to restrain itself concerning Cuba, in order to avoid Brazil’s voting against them.

  Naturally, all of these are suppositions, because the discussions on the important issues at the conference did not take place publicly, but were held between delegations, and the Cuban delegation never took part in them. We found out later through friends, journalists or members of an enemy country’s delegation who were personal friends and passed on the information. In other words, we found ourselves in the midst of a “cold war,” and methods appropriate to a war were employed.

  In addition, some countries—mainly Bolivia and Ecuador—took outstanding positions in the defense of democratic principles and the people’s self-determination. They joined C
uba many times and showed the real importance that their governments gave to the conference. Because of them, Cuba never felt alone.

  Bolivia’s attitude was especially admirable and courageous in the conference—so much so that the members of cliques called its delegates “the Cubans’ first cousins,” a nickname that was very dangerous for a country in Bolivia’s particular situation. The Bolivians’ position on many points in the discussion was very outspoken.

  The 10 or 12 days of discussions were very intense; we had to be constantly on guard in one commission or another—there were four commissions in total—and we had to fight against the attempts that were made to inject poison in the declarations, articles and foundations of declarations in order to place Cuba in a difficult position.

  In the general assembly, the Cuban delegation acted with great firmness; all of my compañeros did a tremendous job. We can say that the Cuban delegation was a model of discipline and that none of its members did anything in Punta del Este but work in the commissions in circumstances in which, as always happens in this kind of conference, some of the representatives of other countries hardly ever showed up but rather spent their time in the casinos and other such places of amusement, which were plentiful.

  Naturally, with all the responsibilities it bears right now, Cuba could not allow itself to engage in that kind of thing, and its continuous work in all the commissions gradually modified even the approach of some countries that are out-and-out enemies of ours.

  Cuba raised its voice, expressing its opinion, in all the commissions. Cuba’s opinions were defeated in the votes, but many delegates who voted against them did so unwillingly.

  When a foreign delegate greeted us publicly, it was a significant expression of independence and daring, because they then became the focus of all the other delegates’ gaze, the cameras of the many representatives of the international press and the attention of the intelligence services— especially those of the United States.

  Even so, there were many surprises. Many people approached us individually, saying that, in general, a new stage in the Americas had been initiated at Punta del Este. This new stage was created by the peoples’—or, rather, the governments’—sense of independence. Most of the peoples were not represented at Punta del Este—only the Cuban people and a few others. In general, the governments represented the oligarchies of each country, each one faced with serious problems, which made them realize it would be difficult to survive in the coming years. It is not a long-term problem anymore, it is a problem of how to get through the coming months or the coming year, how to manage to hang on until the end of your term in office, how to manage to stay in power without causing upsets, without having to confront serious problems.

  They had seen how Cuba’s stance, two and a half years after we had liberated ourselves, had increasingly become a head-on confrontation with the United States, but they also saw that no catastrophe had occurred and that Cuba’s development was very accelerated—which did not interest most of the countries very much, but they were interested in the fact that there were great possibilities for surviving, even against the will of the United States. This interested them because they used Cuba as a kind of blackmail. Sitting near us was a delegate of one of the dictatorial countries that has broken off relations with us—personally, he is a very nice man—and he admitted cynically that he was “in the beneficial shadow of Che, trying to see what I can get.” Naturally, the “shadow of Che” was not the shadow of Che at all; it was the shadow of the Cuban revolution, which, with its steadfast attitude and complete denunciation all the North Americans’ plans, enabled other countries to reap small benefits, and many of them did try to get something. For the first time in a Latin American conference, divergent voices were raised, which forced the United States to change its strategy—a strategy it had been preparing for some time, with trips by the foreign ministers of other countries, statements by top-ranking US authorities aimed at creating a climate for holding a foreign ministers’ conference to first call on Cuba to rejoin the Latin American countries, and abandon its “nefarious alliance” and then to denounce and isolate it.

  The Punta del Este conference was a kind of advance payment made to the governments for their complicity in this. Even so, our attitude of resolute denunciation—as well as the support of Brazil, a country of enormous importance, and several other Latin American countries, categorically opposing the linking of this conference with any other one—seem to have put paid to US plans right now. I say “seem to have” because there is no way of knowing for sure what will happen. The United States is a very powerful country; it has a lot of levers for manipulating the oligarchies of the countries it controls, and it will keep on working in that regard. Nevertheless, we think that it will be very difficult for it to call a foreign ministers’ conference right now.

  It is hardly necessary to say that, if it does call such a conference and if it denounces us, it will not be anything more than a formal denunciation that the people will not support and that will be totally against themselves, and it will bring the countries that participate in it nothing but trouble. In any case, it will be very difficult to hold such a conference. Some of the very large countries, such as Brazil, have assured us that they will not participate in it; the president of Argentina adopted a similar stand yesterday; and Mexico’s position on this is well known, so the most important Latin American countries are absolutely opposed to bringing any kind of political pressure to bear against Cuba.

  The final result of the conference was a voluminous legacy setting forth the Latin American peoples’ aspirations for the coming 10 years, in the decade of “accelerated, fruitful, democratic progress.” It has a preamble, called the Declaration to the Peoples of the Americas, which tries to sum up the proceedings; it is a verbose summary, full of adjectives and no figures, but says nothing and makes nothing obligatory.

  From the political point of view, the conference may be considered a resounding failure for US aspirations to denounce Cuba. From the viewpoint of its special economic policy, I doubt that it was such a great failure, because the United States has made the peoples—in other words, the governments, and, through the Latin American governments, the peoples—believe that it is really willing to help them, when this is not the case at all. Even if it were willing to help, it cannot do so; and, even if it could, it would have to help the ruling circles allied to the monopoly interests in each country, not the ruling circles alone, so the investments would turn into new business for the monopolies or for the oligarchies themselves that want to deposit their money in the United States.

  In other words, the wheel would come full circle—just as it used to do in Cuba, before liberation, when local groups joined forces with US interests, had common businesses favored by the government, made money, turned their money into dollars and deposited those dollars in the United States.

  Naturally, that system in no way benefited the peoples. But the main statement, the main part of that long document called the Punta del Este accord is really the part in which the United States sets the amounts it would give to Latin America. The paragraph where those amounts are set forth does not commit the United States, because it is drawn up so vaguely that, really, the United States can refer to this document to show that it has no basic obligations:

  The United States declares that, if the peoples of Latin America adjust their economic policies, the United States and other western powers, such as West Germany and Japan, might consider investing no less than US$20 billion over the course of the next decade.

  In other words, it is filled with dubious phrases and, unquestionably, the United States does not pledge to do anything more than take some steps, look on with sympathy, and consider the possibilities. The only effective obligation of the United States is to give a billion dollars during this first year, but a billion dollars in such a way that half a billion has already been appropriated: that was the first half billion dollars that Congress had authorized; as for
the other half million, we will have to see. Moreover, there was a requirement that complete projects would have to be submitted within 60 days of the signing of the Punta del Este accord.

  It is impossible to present a project, or even a draft, in 60 days, so the only thing it will finance will be what has already been done, what has already been discussed. Some projects will be carried out in the northeastern part of Brazil with financing that has already been granted by the US government; presumably, there will be something in Argentina, too; there has been talk of building a hydroelectric power station in the Chocón region and irrigating the land. But the small countries will not be able to implement any kind of project, and they will see very little—if any—of those first billion dollars.

  About that first $1 billion, half a billion is apparently real, and the other half billion is more a subject for discussion than anything else. As for the other $19 billion— that constitutes the nub of the confidence trick.

  Therefore, in spite of everything, I feel the United States is still to impose a scheme of this kind, in spite of the new influences that have arisen, the new pressures from the peoples. In reality, it is scandalous how the peoples are being swindled.

  The US Senate and House of Representatives have the power to grant or withhold those loans. Therefore, Representative Dillon, the treasury secretary, simply came and made statements on his own behalf that now have to be ratified by Congress. And, as far as I can see, only cut-down versions of these commitments will be ratified, if any at all.

  So it is possible that none of the paltry offerings in the declaration, considered to be cause for such great hope for the peoples, will materialize.

  Even so, Cuba presented 29 projects, and the spirit of those projects—none of which were approved in full—is reflected in some of the document’s resolutions. Even the United States signed the document, but it lodged two formal reservations on Chapter 3, which concerns raw materials and is a fundamental issue. Point One in that chapter was about development planning, which later became development programming—the name was changed. Point Two concerned the integration of a Latin American common market. Point Three was about raw materials and problems related to their prices and markets. Point Four was the annual report to be prepared, with participation by economic ministers, in a different country in the Americas each year. Point Five, about making the Alliance for Progress better known, was practically eliminated. In its present form, Point Five is of no interest; Point Four is merely administrative, about the annual report; so the discussion centered around the other three points.