The African Dream Read online

  General considerations: Given that my experience of the Congo is limited to a month and a half, I cannot venture many opinions. I believe that we face one main danger: US imperialism.

  It is not necessary to analyze why the North Americans are a specific danger. The Congolese revolution is in a stage of regrouping its forces, after the most recent defeats it has suffered. If the Yankees have learned lessons from other revolutions, now is the moment they would choose to strike hard and, first of all, take measures such as a neutralization of the lake; that is, to do everything necessary to close our main supply route. On the other hand, world events such as the struggle in Vietnam and the recent intervention at Santo Domingo are tying their hands somewhat. Time is therefore an essential factor for the consolidation and development of the revolution, which can be achieved only through heavy blows against the enemy. Passivity is the beginning of defeat.

  But our own lack of organization hinders us from mobilizing all our forces and attacking those of the enemy. This can be seen in a number of interconnected aspects.

  1. There is shortage of cadres with no unified central command with real power over all the fronts, which would confer what is known in military terms as a unity of doctrine (I refer specifically to this area, not to the Congo in general).

  2. The general shortage of cadres with sufficient level of education and absolute loyalty to the revolutionary cause results in a proliferation of local chiefs, each with his own authority and both tactical and strategic freedom of action.

  3. The dispersal of our heavy weapons through an egalitarian distribution that leaves the command without reserves—quite apart from the poor way these weapons are used.

  4. There is a lack of discipline in the military units, which have been infected by the prevailing localism and have had no prior training.

  5. The commanders are incapable of coordinating the movements of units beyond a certain size.

  6. There is a general lack of the minimum training necessary to handle firearms, a lack all the more serious in the case of weapons requiring special combat preparation.

  All this produces an inability to carry out substantial tactical operations, and therefore strategic paralysis. These are problems that every revolution has to face, and there is no cause for alarm; it is only necessary to take systematic measures to rectify them.

  Cuban involvement: Our black population suffered the worst exploitation and discrimination in Cuba. Their involvement in the struggle was very important, especially the peasants in Oriente [province], most of whom were illiterate.

  As a result, there were very few blacks among our main military figures or properly trained middle cadres. When we were asked to send black [Afro-] Cubans by preference, we looked to the best elements in the army who had some combat experience. As we see it, our contingent has a very good fighting spirit and precise knowledge of tactics on the ground, but has little academic preparation.

  The foregoing is by way of an introduction to our proposals for action. Given the characteristics of the soldiers, our involvement should mainly be in combat and tasks related to the direct struggle.

  We could do this in two ways:

  1. We could split our contingent among the various units at the front as instructors in the handling of weapons and as combatants with Congolese forces.

  2. Create mixed combat units, initially under Cuban command, that would carry out clearly defined tactical missions and expand their radius of operations through the development and training of Congolese command cadres. (Given the small size of our force, there should be no more than two of these units.) A central training base would be maintained, with Cuban instructors insofar as they were needed.

  We favor the second proposal, for both military and political reasons: military, because it would guarantee leadership in accordance with our concept of guerrilla struggle (which we think is correct); political, because our successes would dispel the atmosphere that surrounds foreign troops who have different religious, cultural and other ideas, and would enable us to control our own forces better. A greater degree of dispersal could lead to conflicts due to the lack of understanding of Congolese reality that our command believes is being acquired.

  We could perform (necessary) complementary work, such as plans for training units, help in the training of a General Staff (and understanding of the services and, above all, of the weapons are weak areas), the organization of public health or military sanitation, or any other task we might be assigned.

  Our assessment of the military situation: There is persistent talk of the capture of Albertville. But we think that, at the present moment, there is a higher task facing our forces for the following reasons:

  1. We have not been able to dislodge the enemy from enclaves within our natural defense system (these mountains).

  2. We don’t have sufficient experience for such a large-scale initiative that would require the mobilization of units of at least battalion strength and their synchronization through an operational high command.

  3. We don’t have enough military equipment for an action of this scale.

  Albertville should fall as the result of gradual, tenacious action on our part—perhaps it would be more appropriate to speak of its being abandoned by the enemy. First, we must completely deflate the enemy’s fighting morale (which is relatively high at present), by means of systematic attacks on their lines of supply and reinforcements; then annihilate, or force the withdrawal, of the enemy forces from Kabimba, Front de Force, Lulimba, etc., combining the above tactics with frontal assaults where the relationship of forces is more favorable, clandestine action on all the roads leading to Albertville, frequent sabotage operations and ambushes and paralysis of the economy; then, finally the seizure of Albertville.

  For reasons that I will develop in another report, the results of our reconnaissance lead me to think that Katenga would be the best place to start operations.

  The reasons I can give today are the following.

  1. Its garrison is relatively small.

  2. We think we can ambush reinforcements as their supply line runs parallel to the mountains.

  3. If Katenga were to fall and remain in our hands, this would isolate Lulimba, as the gateway to Kasongo.

  Following this letter, I sent the reconnaissance report on Katenga, the analysis of the situation and a recommendation to attack. At that time it was relatively easy to attack Katenga because the total inactivity of our forces meant that the enemy’s vigilance in the area was practically nonexistent.

  1. For Che, a characteristic of the guerrilla nucleus is that it must guarantee that revolutionary political power remains intact, being “relatively safe but not outside the war, not giving directions from some other country or from distant places. It should be within its own country, fighting.” Che stressed this in his 1961 article, “Cuba: Historical exception or vanguard in the anticolonial struggle?” in Che Guevara Reader (Ocean Press). This became one of his major criticisms of the Congolese leadership.

  2. Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of China from its establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976. He was also minister of foreign relations (1949-58) and led the Chinese delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955.

  3. In Che’s original manuscript he wrote “Kabimba” in error. This is another place on Lake Tanganyika located further south, where Che never went.

  A DEFEAT

  Mitoudidi’s replacements embarked for Kigoma, and some, like Compañero Muteba, the bearer of my letter to Kabila, we never saw again for the duration of the war.

  The base was again overcome by chaos with an almost conscious frenzy, as if to make up for time lost during Mitoudidi’s intervention. Orders and requests succeeded one another without the slightest trace of rationality. We Cubans were asked to staff machine guns spread along the lakeside, thereby condemning a number of compañeros to inactivity. Given the prevailing lack of discipline, it would have been impossible to use Congolese machine-gunners to
defend the base from air attack as they didn’t know how to use those weapons and didn’t want to learn; with a few honorable exceptions, they never operated machine guns during our entire time in the Congo. They ran away from aircraft, instead of methodically doing something about them, even though machine guns played a role in driving away enemy aircraft. The crews were mainly mercenaries, and after one or two skirmishes, they lost interest in fighting against ground-based weapons and turned to the strafing and bombing of areas where there was no antiaircraft defense. Nevertheless, I think the fact that the men at the Lake [Base] were inactive was a pointless waste of our combat strength as the enemy was unable to mount an effective attack; four T-28s and two B-26s were the only force the enemy had.

  We continued to face the same difficulties at the Upper Base, only with many compañeros suffering from Congo fever and with no trainees as those promised by Mitoudidi never arrived. We saw representatives of distant guerrilla units show up to take away arms and ammunition, which they would squander, waste or break for no purpose. Compañero Mundandi arrived around the middle of June, bringing some letters from Kabila. One, dated June 16, stated the following:

  Comrade,

  I have read and reread the report you sent with Brother Muteba for my attention. As I said before, comrade, I want to begin some ambushes; Comrade Mundandi will talk to you about this. Please allow a good 50 Cubans with the rank of combatant to take part in the attack of June 25 under the leadership of Mundandi.

  You are a revolutionary and I ask you to put up with all the difficulties you find there as I will arrive very soon. You can also send a good dozen men to Kabimba.

  Intimate greetings,

  Kabila

  P.S. I appreciated your plan concerning Bendera that Nando showed me. It is almost identical to what we had been thinking. Courage and patience. I know that you are suffering because of the poor organization, but we are doing everything to improve it. It’s the fault of our lack of leaders.

  Hasta la vista,

  Kabila

  As Kabila said he agreed with the plan I had sent, we began discussing an attack with Mundandi, not on Bendera, but on Katenga a few kilometers away. Mundandi proved hard to pin down; he had no definite plan himself, just an order to attack on June 25. I asked him why on that date and again he had no answer. We discussed our plan for attacking, not Bendera directly, but the village of Katenga, in order to draw reinforcements that we could destroy on the road, but he would not respond yes or no. He seemed to be a simple soul, entrusted with a task beyond his capabilities; but there was also a large dose of dissembling.

  Evidently, Mundandi and Kabila had decided between themselves to attack Front de Force, perhaps trusting that a surprise attack might lead to a large-scale victory over the enemy army. I feared for the safety of the Cubans and Rwandan compañeros, who were supposed to take part in the action, if they staged a direct attack on unknown positions in which there were trenches, natural defenses and heavy weapons. My first reaction was to participate personally in the operation. Kabila had specified that the men should put themselves under Mundandi’s orders, thus subtly rejecting my proposal that Cubans should lead the tactical actions involving mixed troops. I decided that this was not the most important aspect, thinking that with my authority I would be able to push through correct solutions in the course of discussions. Mundandi knew who I was and seemed to respect me. I therefore wrote Kabila a short note as follows:

  Dear comrade,

  Thank you for your letter. You can rest assured that my impatience is that of a man of action; it implies no criticism. I am able to understand things because I myself have lived through similar conditions.

  I also eagerly await your arrival because I consider you an old friend and I owe you an explanation. At the same time, it is my duty to place myself unconditionally under your orders.

  As you instructed, the Cubans will leave tomorrow for Front de Force. Unfortunately, many are sick and the total number will be a little lower (40). There are four comrades in Kabimba. We will send the others as they arrive.

  I would ask you one favor: Give me permission to go to Front de Force, with no other title than that of my compañeros’ “political commissar,” fully under the orders of Comrade Mundandi. I have just talked to him and he is in agreement. I think this might prove useful. I would report back within three or four days of receiving your call.

  Greetings,

  Tatu

  I had actually discussed with Mundandi the possibility of my going along, and—on the face of it, at least—he had been in agreement. But he stressed that he would have to send the men without waiting for Kabila’s reply, and this made me suspect that it would be negative.

  The reply arrived a few days later and was not negative but evasive as usual. Still I had time to write a second letter, urging him to give me a frank “yes” or “no.” This allowed for no beating around the bush, and he simply did not answer it. So I didn’t go to Front de Force.

  The men left on the appointed day, numbering 36 rather than the 40 I had mentioned. But shortly afterwards we sent another seven, making a total of 43. We received reports that all were well, but that the attack had been delayed. Mundandi had not yet showed up. The men sent a request to have a doctor on hand, and we were able to grant this because just then a group of 39 more compañeros had arrived, including three doctors (a surgeon, an orthopedist and a general practitioner).

  The first battle report stated:

  Tatu or Kumi, the attack began at 5:00 a.m. today, June 29, 1965. We are doing well. Apparently Katenga is under attack. Five of our compañeros, Nane as group leader and two Rwandan compañeros are there.

  Patria o Muerte! [Homeland or death!]

  Moja

  And later:

  It’s 7:30 [a.m.]. Things are going well. The men are very content and conducting themselves well. Everything started at the appointed time. We opened fire with a cannon shell and a mortar round. I’ll send more information later.

  At the same time as this note, however, there was alarming news of scores of dead, Cubans killed, men wounded, which made me think that all was not well. Shortly before they set out, I had received a note:

  On the 29th we will do it at Front de Force. It was not possible to convince the man. We’ll report after the event.

  Compañeros Mbili and Moja had long discussions trying to persuade Commander Mundandi not to attack in the way he had planned, but he did not shift his position, claiming to have orders from Kabila. Later, Kabila would say he had given no such orders.

  At Front de Force or Front Bendera, there is a hydroelectric power station on the banks of the Kimbi River; its water source is almost in the mountains controlled by the Rwandans, while the electricity lines pass across level ground (as the mountains fall sharply down to the high plain of the Congo Basin). The village is divided in two: an old part, before one reaches the power station, and a newer part close to the turbines, where there is a military quarter with more than 80 houses. The Kimbi River, one of its natural defenses, was suitably reinforced with trenches that had been very superficially reconnoitered before the attack. There was also a landing field for light aircraft. It was thought that an enemy battalion of 500 to 700 men might be there, plus a concentration of special troops four kilometers away, at the junction with the Albertville road where there was said to be a cadet school or a military training college.

  All we were able to achieve with Mundandi was that Cubans were put as commanders in charge of the main combat zones. The attached diagram1 gives a rough idea of the disposition of forces only on the northern side, with ambushes on both sides of the Lulimba to Albertville road. The plan was as follows:

  A small group led by Ishirini would attack the so-called chariot, the source supplying water to the hydro-electric turbine; below, across the Kimbi River, a group of men under Lieutenant Azi would attack the fortified positions closest to the mountain; and in the center, Lieutenant Azima and a group of Rwandans would c
apture the airfield and advance to link up with Azi; meanwhile Lieutenant Maffu would have another group preventing movement from Lulimba and Lieutenant Nne, who was in the strongest position with a 75 mm. cannon and other heavy weapons, would lay ambushes on the road from Albertville. The command post, where Moja and Mundandi would remain, would be on the other side of the Kimbi River at the base of the mountain foothills. Mundandi originally proposed having two command posts, but he was persuaded that it would be best for them to be united.

  This plan had some serious drawbacks. Nne had to march to an unfamiliar area that had not been reconnoitered. Maffu knew something about the area, as did Azi, and Azima had made a superficial examination with binoculars from the mountains. But as we were expecting reinforcements to be sent from Albertville, we should have had a very well-laid ambush; instead we were setting one up blindly. There was a lot of discussion with Mundandi for the main effort to be directed at Katenga, and in the end he agreed to send an order to Captain Salumu to attack there. But, as became clear later, the order was given for the 30th, whereas Mundandi went ahead on the 29th.

  At Front de Force, things did not go remotely as well as the first indications had led us to expect.

  Ishirini, along with two other Cubans and seven Rwandans armed with rocket launchers and rifles, had the task of attacking the chariot to silence a machine-gun nest and to cause some damage to the plant; but all that happened was that the lights went out for a few minutes. The Rwandan combatants remained a couple of kilometers away from the scene of the action, which was carried out by the Cubans alone. To give some idea of the confusion, I will transcribe in full the report by Lieutenant Azi, whose mission was to attack across the Kimbi River: